【摘要】This study incorporates the strategic behavior of outsourcing with a variantHotelling model to explore the role of input outsourcing in determining equilibriumlocations for firms under quadratic transportation. Given that strategic input outsourcingoccurs; we show that the cost-efficient integrated firm will locate as far away fromits rival as possible; so as to increase its rival’s input price when its own cost advantageis small; at the same time; the cost-inefficient downstream firm likes to locate closerto its rival to lower the input price. Hence; there is an interior locational equilibrium;and the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold. When an integrated firm’scost advantage is large; the principle of maximum differentiation is valid. However;when the integrated firm’s own cost advantage is even larger; the integrated firm canbecome a monopolist through strategic input outsourcing. Under this case; the equilibriumlocation depends on the magnitude of the input homemade ratio when the inputhomemade ratio is small. Otherwise; the integrated firm would like to locate at themiddle of the market.

【文献来源】Lin Y J;Lin Y S;Tu K I. Annals of regional Science.2016(1)