【摘要】This paper studies a zoning mechanism that gives the optimal locations of two firmsin a linear city under mill prices. A regulator biased towards consumers allows a central area of the city to be shared by firms and consumers and thus firms are not allowed to locate outside the city limits. A regulator more concerned about firms extends this central zone outside the city limits and the city has a residential use only if the firms so decide. Finally, a regulator highly biased towards firms allows them to locate only beyond a set distance from the city, so there is a strip of land outside the city but close to its boundaries, for alternative uses.

【关键词】Zoning;regulation;firms’ locations

【文献来源】Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz;F. Javier Casado-Izaga;Hamid Hamoudi;Isabel Rodriguez .Papers in Regional Studies.2016（2）