【摘要】This note describes an attempt to model increasing returns that arise because of spe- cialization. The idea that increasing returns and specialization are closely related is quite old, but, apparently for technical reasons, we have no fully worked out dynamic model of growth along these lines. There are now several models of growth that consider in- creasing returns that arise from the accumu- lation of knowledge. (See, for example, my dissertation, 1983, and 1986a paper; Robert Lucas, 1985; Edward Prescott and John Boyd, 1987.) Despite the presence of aggre- gate increasing returns, these models can support a decentralized competitive equi- librium with externalities; the externalities arise because of spillovers of knowledge. At least since the publication of Kenneth Arrow's 1962 paper on learning by doing, it has been clear that a competitive equilibrium with externalities provides a tractable frame- work for the study of increasing returns in a dynamic model. The model described here shows that a closely related framework can be used to study specialization.

【关键词】conflict;

【文献来源】Romer P M. The American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1987), pp. 56- 62