【摘要】This   paper examines how the spatial distribution of economic activity evolved   within North Korea during a period of economic sanctions. Countries have used   economic sanctions to isolate North Korea from the benefits of international   trade and finance. China, however, has not imposed the sanctions, and   consequentially has offset the trade restrictions imposed by other countries.   I hypothesize three channels by which North Korea could have responded in   this context: regional favoritism by the ruling elites, reallocation of   commerce that reflects the trade diversion to China, and import substitution.   Using nighttime lights from North Korea, I find that the capital city, trade   hubs near China, and manufacturing cities become relatively brighter when   sanctions increase. However, production shifts away from capital-intensive   goods, potentially deterring industrial development. The results imply that   despite the intention to target the ruling elites, sanctions may increase   regional inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands.

【关键词】Regional inequality；Economic sanctions；Elite capture；Economic geography；Importsubstitution.North Korea

【文献来源】Yong Suk Lee. International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea. Journal of Urban Economics, 2018, 103.34-51.